Israel Studies

The Protocol of Sevres: British/French/Israeli Collusion against Egypt, 1956

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Israel Studies 1.2 (1996) 122-139
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The Protocol of Sèvres:
British/French/Israeli Collusion Against Egypt, 1956

S. Ilan Troen

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Introduction

Conventional wisdom holds that the Suez/Sinai crisis of 1956 was a significant turning point in the history of the Middle East and in international relations. The failure of the British and French to impose their will on Nasser and regain control of the Suez Canal marked the irrevocable decline of European imperialism. The United States and the Soviet Union filled the vacuum in the Middle East as they did elsewhere. Despite losses on the field of battle, Egypt won in the international political arena, and Nasser emerged as the primary leader of Egypt and the Arab world. Israel gained a striking military victory in what many considered the "second War of Independence" and enjoyed a decade of relative calm on its land borders and free navigation from Eilat through the Red Sea. On the level of individual histories, 1956 established the reputations of Nasser and Dayan. It destroyed Eden and contributed to the downfall of the French leadership.

The events surrounding the Suez/Sinai crisis of 1956 and the war itself have been a subject of continuing research for the past 40 years. While the historiographical issues have been long settled, there has been continual fascination with discovering new documentation. Perhaps the primary reason has been the charge that the war was a product of "collusion" between Britain, France, and Israel. It has long been held that the leaders of these three governments dissembled, not only before their own citizens, but before ministers and responsible officials in their own governments about the decision to initiate war. While many guessed at the true relationships between Britain, France, and Israel shortly after the outbreak of hostilities, finding authoritative documentation has engaged the best efforts of a legion of scholars and journalists for the past 40 years. 1

Key elements of how the war was planned and unfolded have been [End Page 122] published by various participants in more or less authorized forms since the early 1960s. Nevertheless, until recently important documentation has been missing. In 1986, in accordance with the thirty-year rule permitting the publication of sensitive official documents, I was able to publish the relevant portions of Ben-Gurion's diary of 1956. In addition to revealing much of the Israeli involvement in the conflict, the diary contains perhaps the clearest and most "official" account of the final negotiations leading to the signing on 24 October 1956 of the document detailing the British-French-Israeli "collusion"—the Protocol of Sèvres. The diary also discusses and quotes extensively from four other documents that were vital to putting the Protocol into operation. First, there was an "Annex" in which the French promised air and naval protection to Israel from possible Egyptian retaliation. There were also three brief letters in which the leaders of the British, French, and Israeli governments confirmed what was concluded at Sèvres and thereby gave operational authorization for the timetable and terms of battle outlined in the Protocol. The first was the letter of 25 October from British Prime Minister Eden to his French counterpart, Guy Mollet. The second, from 26 October, was a letter from Mollet to Ben-Gurion which included Eden's letter as an appendix. The third was Ben-Gurion response to Mollet of October 26. With this circle now complete, Ben-Gurion gave the order that evening to prepare for the initiation of hostilities. This series of documents is presented here—the Protocol and Annex, presented in the original and in translation, together with the accompanying correspondence. 2

The meeting at Sèvres brought together a handful of political leaders and military experts from Britain, France, and Israel. The key French officials involved were Prime Minister Guy Mollet, Foreign Minister Christian Pineau, Minister of National Defence Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury, Director-General of the Defence Ministry Abel Thomas, Deputy to the Chief of Staff for Air Force Affairs General Maurice Challe and his.

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